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Abstract 
How should online retailers attract customers? Should they advertise intensively to attract online 
traffic, or should they simply price lower than their competitors? To answer these questions, we 
develop a game-theoretic model of two firms choosing advertising levels and prices strategically. 
We find that only asymmetric equilibria exist, where e-tailers choose different strategies along both 
advertising and pricing dimensions. When market mobility is low (i.e., the majority of buyers have 
high search costs), firms engage in fierce competition in advertising, and the firm with a higher 
advertising level charges a higher price and earns higher profits. When market mobility is high (i.e., 
the majority of buyers have zero search costs) or medium, one firm may choose to advertise intensely 
while the other may choose to charge a lower price and not advertise at all. In such cases, either firm 
may make higher profits. We also compare the market outcome in our model to the case in which 
firms do not have the option of advertising and find that the option to advertise leads to higher 
expected prices. We further extend the model to consider e-tailers choosing advertising levels 
sequentially. 
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1 Introduction 
How should online retailers (e-tailers) compete for 
customers? Should they advertise intensively to direct 
online traffic to their websites, hoping clicks will lead 
to purchases? Or should they simply price lower than 
their competitors, counting on consumers insatiably 
seeking better deals to locate them? We summarize 
these two approaches as “competing for attention” and 
“competing in price,” respectively. Prior research has 
generally studied competition along these two 
dimensions separately. In this paper, we consider 
firms’ optimal decisions concerning both advertising 
expenditure and product pricing and further 
characterize the market outcome when firms compete 
in terms of both advertising and price. 
These two dimensions of e-commerce: pricing and 
advertising, are rooted deeply in the literature and 
reflect key insights about how the Internet changes 
business practices. Early literature on e-commerce 
posits that the use of the Internet will make price and 
product information increasingly available and 
transparent to consumers, leading to fierce price 
competition among sellers and the “law of one price” 
ruling the online marketplace (see, among others, 
Bakos, 1997). The emergence of price comparison 
sites makes information in an already competitive 
online market even more accessible. This has 
motivated numerous empirical studies to attempt to 
prove whether the law of one price holds (see, e.g., 
Ghose & Yao, 2011) with many studies finding that 
price dispersion does exist (see, among others, 
Brynjolfsson & Smith, 2000; Clemons, Hann, & Hitt, 
2002; Baye, Morgan, & Scholten, 2004; Li, Gu, & Liu, 
2013), which has, in turn, spawned further research 
devoted to finding possible explanations (e.g., Pan, 
Ratchford, & Shankar, 2002; Venkatesan, Mehta, & 
Bapna, 2007; Ba, Stallaert, & Zhang, 2012). 
Another equally influential notion is that attention has 
become a scarce commodity on the Internet and can 
even be regarded as “the hard currency of cyberspace” 
(der Leun & Mandel, 1996; Goldhaber, 1997). Herbert 
A. Simon predicts that in an information-rich world, “a 
wealth of information creates a poverty of attention” 
(Simon, 1971). Online advertising has become one of 
the fastest growing industry segments enabled by the 




Internet, and e-tailers make substantial marketing 
expenditures to attract buyers (Hoffman & Novak, 
2000). Internet advertising revenues in the United 
States reached $72.5 billion in 2016, increasing 21.8% 
over 2015 (PwC, 2017). Online retailers are 
advertising intensively to attract buyers’ attention— 
hoping to convert attention into website traffic and, 
eventually, purchases (Falkinger, 2003); Huberman & 
Wu, 2007). According to a survey of 221 retailers 
conducted by Shop.org, customer acquisition costs are 
more than twice as high for pure-play e-tailers as for 
brick-and-mortar retailers. Taobao.com, the world’s 
largest online platform for e-tailers, does not charge 
sellers for commission; instead, it adopts the business 
model of charging advertising fees to sellers, some of 
which report spending over a third of their revenues on 
buying customer traffic (Chen, Fan, & Li, 2016). 
We believe that both advertising and pricing are key 
issues faced by e-tailers. E-tailers must decide how 
much they should spend on advertising and what price 
they should charge, given their competitors’ behavior. 
We study how firms make these decisions as well as 
how these two decisions affect each other. We are also 
interested in the overall market outcomes. If all e-
tailers advertise to attract buyers, will e-tailers find 
themselves in a classic prisoner’s dilemma in 
equilibrium? How do such decisions affect price levels 
in the market and the e-tailers’ profitability? This study 
attempts to answer these questions. 
We develop a game-theoretical model in which two e-
tailers compete for buyers using two mechanisms: 
advertising and price. One key feature of our model is 
that consumers are heterogeneous when searching for 
products online. Following the convention of the 
literature, consumers who have zero search cost are 
called “shoppers” while those with positive search 
costs are called “high-search-cost buyers” (e.g., Xu, 
Chen, & Whinston, 2011). Intuitively, a low-price 
strategy may be effective for shoppers who tend to 
search for deals on the Internet, while advertising is 
essential for attracting high-search-cost buyers. The 
relative proportion of these two types of consumers 
captures the overall market mobility: the larger the 
shopper segment is, the more mobile the market is. The 
e-tailers’ optimal decisions on prices and advertising 
expenditures depend on market mobility. 
Our model provides a framework for understanding the 
interaction of attention competition, pricing, and 
consumer search behavior. Our research yields some 
interesting results. First, we find that only asymmetric 
equilibria exist, which means that e-tailers choose 
different strategies along both advertising and pricing 
dimensions. When the market mainly consists of high-
search-cost buyers (low market mobility), firms 
engage in fierce competition in advertising, and the 
firm that advertises at a higher level also charges 
higher prices, yielding higher profits. In other words, 
firms are in a situation akin to the prisoner’s dilemma 
in the advertising game (though this is an asymmetric 
equilibrium). 
However, when the market mobility is high or medium, 
differentiated strategies are more effective: one firm 
may choose to advertise to attract high-search-cost 
buyers, while another may choose not to advertise at 
all—instead attracting buyers simply by charging a 
lower average price. Furthermore, in such cases, no 
strategy is superior and either firm may make higher 
profits depending on the parameters. Interestingly, 
firms are most differentiated in their advertising levels 
when market mobility is at a medium level. 
Following a general discussion of our model, we then 
compare the market outcomes in our model with the 
scenario in which firms do not have the option to 
advertise. The option to advertise leads to higher 
expected prices for any given market composition (i.e., 
mobility level), which implies that the existence of 
advertising is worse for shoppers. Interestingly, when 
market mobility is high, both types of e-tailers make 
higher profits when the option to advertise exists—
even the firm that advertises intensively and bears the 
extra cost. This is because the option to advertise 
allows firms to differentiate along two dimensions, 
which attenuates the price competition. 
We also discuss the effects of other market 
characteristics. A novel finding is that even when 
advertising is less expensive, firms do not necessarily 
lower their prices. When market mobility is high, firms 
adopt differentiated strategies, and thus when 
advertising costs less, the firm that focuses on attracting 
high-search-cost buyers can intensify advertising, thus 
ameliorating the price competition (i.e., by charging 
higher prices). We also find that search cost may 
influence the market outcome only under certain 
circumstances—namely, when buyers have a high 
willingness to pay for a product and the market is 
reasonably mobile. Only under these conditions are 
firms’ optimal strategies constrained by buyers’ search 
cost. This is because a firm considers buyers’ search 
behavior in relation to their willingness to pay as well 
as in relation to the overall market composition. 
We further extend the model to consider e-tailers that 
choose advertising levels sequentially. We find that the 
follower’s decision variable is a strategic complement 
to that of the leader: the leader sets its advertising 
intensity at a lower level, compared with scenarios in 
which firms set advertising levels simultaneously, 
which results in higher profits for both firms. In 
essence, moving sequentially provides a cooperative 
mechanism for firms to collectively reduce advertising 
levels. Buyers in this scenario benefit as well because 
market prices are also lower. 
Our research contributes to the literature on consumer 
search and online advertising. First, unlike previous 
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research, in our model, consumers’ search is neither 
uniformly random nor does it occur in a predetermined 
order (see the next section for detailed discussions of 
the related literature). Instead, we allow consumers’ 
search order to vary from one individual to another, with 
each individual following a pattern. Second, in this 
paper, advertising changes the likelihood of a firm being 
sampled first, which is a form of saliency- enhancing 
advertising. There has been limited research on 
saliency-enhancing advertising, as compared to 
persuasive advertising, which addresses consumers’ 
willingness to pay, or informative advertising, which 
contains information about a product (see Bagwell, 
2007). One exception is Haan and Moraga-González’ 
(2011) study, which examines firms’ decisions about 
advertising as a means of enhancing prominence. We 
depart from Haan and Moraga-González in that we find 
that advertising can be used as a differentiation strategy, 
whereas in Haan and Moraga-González’s study, firms 
choose the same advertising level in equilibrium. Lastly, 
we directly address the issue concerning the 
effectiveness of a low-price strategy vs. an advertising 
strategy for e-tailers facing heterogeneous consumers. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 
explains how our research relates and contributes to the 
literature, Section 3 sets up the model, Section 4 presents 
the analysis of the model, Section 5 discusses the effects 
of key features of the model on the results, Section 6 
extends the model to sequential decisions, and Section 7 
summarizes and concludes. Most proofs are presented 
in the Appendix. 
2 Relevant Literature 
Our research draws on several strands of literature. 
Researchers have tried to explain the persistence of price 
dispersion from either the consumer side or the seller 
side. On the seller side, researchers have discovered that 
firms may compete along several dimensions (e.g., 
service quality), which can lead to price dispersion even 
for identical products (Pan et al., 2002; Ba et al, 2012). 
On the consumer side, researchers argue that the 
assumption underlying the “law of one price”—that 
information is fully and freely accessible to 
consumers—does not necessarily hold true in online 
markets. Consumers’ information cost, or search cost, is 
often modeled in one of the following ways. First, 
consumers can be heterogeneous in their search costs, 
with some having significantly higher search costs than 
others (Childers, Carr, Peck, & Carson, 2001; Hong & 
Shum, 2006; Johnson, Moe, Fader, Bellman, & Lohse, 
2004). Second, information is costly when consumers 
have to search and visit stores sequentially (Diamond, 
1971). In both settings, price dispersion occurs, which 
allows firms to compete in terms of price. In this paper, 
we adopt the conventional assumption that consumers 
vary in their search costs, but we depart from the 
literature by allowing consumers to differ in their order 
of search. Our results also provide an alternative 
explanation for price dispersion. 
We present a model in which the order of search is 
neither predetermined nor uniformly random. Classic 
search models assume that consumer search is 
uniformly random, which suggests that each seller is 
equally likely to be sampled (Reinganum, 1979; Salop, 
1977; Stahl, 1989; Varian, 1980). In recent years, a 
small but rapidly growing literature on ordered search 
has emerged. Perry and Wigderson (1986) consider 
consumers who sample a finite number of suppliers in 
a known, predetermined order with uncertain costs and 
show that the observed prices could be non-monotonic 
in the search order. Arbatskaya (2007) shows a pure-
strategy price equilibrium in a predetermined ordered 
search model. In the information systems and Internet 
marketing literature, much research has been 
conducted on webpage visibility, web location 
competition, and search patterns. Lohse (1997) and 
Hoque and Lohse (1999) use experiments to explore 
factors that affect visibility or the prominence of web 
locations. Weber and Zheng (2007) study the design of 
search intermediaries and firms’ bidding strategies 
given consumers’ search behavior. Xu et al. (2011) 
demonstrate pricing patterns in an ordered search 
framework. Xu, Chen, and Whinston (2012), He and 
Chen (2006) and Athey and Ellison (2011) study the 
bidding behavior in monopolistic search advertising 
market. Common to these studies is the assumption 
that all users follow the same search order, often 
prescribed by an advertising intermediary. In reality, e-
tailers usually promote across a large number of 
channels, and any of these channels can be the starting 
point of a consumer’s search. In sum, we differ from 
both the literature with ordered search and the classic 
search literature with uniformly random search: in our 
model, consumers may vary in terms of the first e-tailer 
they sample, but each individual follows a specific 
pattern of search depending on his or her own 
particular type. 
Our research is related to the attention competition 
literature (e.g., Falkinger, 2008; Armstrong, Vickers, 
& Zhou, 2009; Haan & Moraga-González, 2011). In 
these studies, the efficacy of ads is decided by 
signal/advertising strength, which endogenously 
generates demand functions or search probability. In 
our model, advertising has similar effects: the more 
intensely an e-tailer advertises, the more likely the e-
tailer is to be visited first by consumers. When buyers 
view both e-tailers’ ads on the same advertising 
channel, our setting implies that each e-tailer will have 
a 50% chance being visited first, exhibiting the 
crowding-out effect. However, our research departs 
from this literature in several ways. Falkinger (2008) 
describes economies facing attention scarcity and does 
not discuss firms’ strategies. In Armstrong et al. 
(2009), the prominence of a firm is exogenously given 




rather than given by choice. Our model is more closely 
related to Haan and Moraga-González’ (2011) study, 
but in Haan and Moraga-González’ (2011) study, firms 
are differentiated in their products ex ante but adopt the 
same advertising strategy ex post; in contrast, in our 
model, the firms are identical ex ante but choose 
asymmetric advertising strategies ex post. 
Our work is loosely related to the study of Internet 
advertising intermediaries. This line of research 
investigates how intermediaries allocate user traffic and 
price prominent locations (Baye & Morgan, 2001; Chen, 
Iyer, & Padmanabhan, 2002; Hagiu & Jullien, 2011; 
Iyer & Pazgal, 2003; Weber & Zheng, 2007; 
Zettelmeyer, 2000). They find that by allocating buyers 
only to chosen firms, the monopolistic information 
intermediary relaxes price competition between firms 
and extracts surplus (Baye & Morgan, 2001; Chen et al., 
2002; Hagiu &Jullien, 2011; Iyer &Pazgal, 2003). In our 
model, there is no monopolistic buyer allocator and 
firms endogenously set advertising levels in an attempt 
to reach consumers. Note that in our model, advertising 
is assumed to be effective, which implies that the 
intermediaries, if any, are transparent. Modeling the 
detailed mechanisms of intermediaries may help firms 
decide “how to advertise,” whereas our research focuses 
on firms’ decision of “to advertise or not to advertise.” 
3 Model 
Consider two e-tailers selling the same product online 
and facing no capacity constraints. The marginal cost of 
the product is assumed to be constant and the same for 
the firms, thus normalized to zero. The market consists 
of a unit mass of buyers. Each buyer desires, at most, 
one unit of the product and has the same reservation 
price 𝑟. 
We develop a multistage game and the sequence of 
events is as follows. The number of firms, the 
production and advertising costs, and the structure of the 
game are assumed to be common knowledge. Our 
model uses the classic rational expectation equilibrium 
concept (Harsanyi, 1967; Salop & Stiglitz, 1982). 
First, the two e-tailers simultaneously decide on their 
advertising levels, with firm 𝑖  choosing 𝛽𝑖 , where 𝛽𝑖 
represents the percentage of the market that the ads of 
firm 𝑖 can reach. 
Second, after observing the other’s advertising level, the 
two e-tailers simultaneously decide on their pricing 
strategy: Firm 𝑖 chooses a price randomly from 𝐹𝑖(𝑝), 
where 𝐹𝑖(⋅) is a cumulative distribution function. This 
order of events is based on the observation that, in 
practice, e-tailers usually decide on their advertising 
                                                          
1 An e-tailer choosing a higher advertising level is likely to 
intensify online advertising through any media. Therefore, 
budget at a regular interval (e.g., set annually and 
reviewed/adjusted quarterly) while pricing is adjusted 
more frequently. 
Third, buyers search for a satisfactory deal. We assume 
that in equilibrium buyers hold correct conjectures 
about advertising levels and pricing strategies, but 
buyers do not know the firms’ identities—i.e., which 
firm chooses which advertising level and price. We 
assume recall is costless. After visiting the first firm, 
buyers update their beliefs about the identities of the 
firms and decide whether to continue the search. When 
a buyer stops searching, he or she makes a purchase if 
the price is below his or her reservation price. 
We first explain firms’ advertising decisions. E-tailers 
may advertise to attract consumers’ attention and then 
direct consumers to their online storefronts. The e-
tailers can be interpreted as multiproduct sellers each 
supplying a large assortment of products in a given 
category. We assume that ads do not contain price 
information; instead, the ads make potential buyers 
aware of the e-tailer and generate traffic to its online 
store. For example, a camping store may advertise 
itself as the largest camping equipment supplier online 
and attract any customer interested in a tent or a battery 
lantern. 
We characterize the advertising function as follows. 
First, each e-tailer’s advertising scale is assumed to be 
minuscule compared to the overall advertising market, 
so the e-tailers are ad-price takers, and the advertising 
cost function can be assumed to be exogenous (readers 
interested in strategic ads pricing may refer to Chen & 
He, 2011; Varian, 2007; Edelman et al., 2007; and 
Athey & Ellison, 2011 for discussions of auction 
mechanisms used in the pricing of search engine ads). 
Second, given the competitive advertising market, it is 
more costly to reach additional buyers, thus the cost of 
reaching 𝛽 percentage of buyers should be convexly 
increasing (Grossman & Shapiro, 1984). Formally, we 
assume the advertising cost function 𝐴(𝛽) to be twice 
continuously differentiable, strictly increasing, and 
convex. Moreover, we assume that the cost of reaching 
all buyers, 𝐴(𝛽 = 1) , is prohibitively high, so the 
optimal advertising level is less than 1. No advertising 
is costless, so 𝐴(0) = 0 ; and the marginal cost of 
starting to advertise is negligible, so 𝐴′(0) = 0. 
Next, we model how buyer traffic is swayed by e-
tailers’ advertising efforts.1 The e-tailers are assumed 
to independently choose their advertising levels, 𝛽𝑖 , 
and the ads are randomly served in media. When a 
buyer goes online, she has a probability of 𝛽𝑖  to be 
reached by e-tailer 𝑖. Therefore, buyers can be divided 
into four types: (1) a fraction 𝛽1𝛽2 is reached by both 
when an e-tailer advertises more, it can reach more 
consumers, often in various ways. 
A Game-Theoretic Analysis of Online Retailing  
862 
 
firms’ advertising; (2) a fraction 𝛽1(1 − 𝛽2) is reached 
by Firm 1 but not Firm 2; (3) a fraction 𝛽2(1 − 𝛽1) is 
reached by Firm 2 but not Firm 1; (4) a fraction (1 −
𝛽1)(1 − 𝛽2) is reached by neither firm. Naturally type 
2 buyers visit Firm 1 first, and type 3 buyers visit Firm 
2 first. Type 1 buyers choose to visit one of the firms 
first with equal likelihood since the two firms appear 
the same.2 Type 4 buyers continue to surf the web until 
they see the link to one of the firms (through third party 
links or organic search), again with an equal chance for 
both firms, regarding which the buyers will visit first. 
We believe the above search pattern captures how 
typical web users process e-tailer advertising 
information. This search pattern implies that the 










. By increasing its 
advertising level, a firm can increase traffic to its store 
and reduce traffic to its competitor’s store, which 
highlights the crowding-out effect of traffic 
competition. In particular, if two firms choose the same 
advertising level, each firm will attract half of the 
buyers and the attention-attracting effect will be 
completely canceled out. 




. Note that 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛼𝑗 = 1 . When 𝛼𝑖 >
0.5 , it means that firm 𝑖  is advertising more 
aggressively than its competitor and, as a result, 
attracts more initial traffic to its site. To further 
simplify notation, we use 𝛼 to denote the traffic to the 
more advertised firm, that is 𝛼 = 𝛼𝑖 =
1+𝛽𝑖−𝛽𝑗
2
 if 𝛽𝑖 ≥
𝛽𝑗 , and 𝛼 = 𝛼𝑗 =
1+𝛽𝑗−𝛽𝑖
2
 if 𝛽𝑖 < 𝛽𝑗 . Therefore 0.5 ≤
𝛼 ≤ 1 . 𝛼  measures the degree that buyer traffic is 
skewed to the more advertised firm: 𝛼 = 0.5 means 
the two firms choose the same level of advertising and 
initial traffic is evenly distributed between the two, 
while 𝛼 = 1 means one firm’s advertising covers the 
entire market while the other does not advertise at all 
and all initial traffic is diverted to the advertised firm. 
Buyers’ search for an e-tailer is modeled as follows. 
Assume buyers do not know which firm chooses which 
advertising level. 3  Buyers’ search behavior involves 
visiting an e-tailer’s website and finding out the 
product and price information. We normalize all 
buyers’ search cost for the first e-tailer to zero, which 
ensures that all buyers must visit at least one e-tailer. This 
technical assumption is commonly used in the literature 
(e.g. Salop & Stiglitz, 1982; Stiglitz, 1987; Stahl, 1989; 
Kuksov, 2004; Jerath, Ma, Park, & Srinivasan, 2011; 
Honka & Chintagunta, 2017; Zhang, Chan, & Xie, 2017). 
Buyers differ in their search costs for the second e-tailer.4 
Assume a proportion 𝛾 of buyers has positive search cost 
𝑐  (high-search-cost buyers) and the rest (1 − 𝛾)  are 
shoppers with zero search cost. The shoppers are akin to 
the informed buyers in Varian (1980) or the switchers in 
Narasimhan (1988). The shopper segment captures the 
notion that some consumers enjoy shopping online or 
have a very low opportunity cost of doing so. This 
assumption is widely adopted in the literature (e.g. Stahl, 
1989). The parameter 𝛾 thus captures the overall mobility 
of the market: 𝛾 = 0 means the market is totally mobile 
where all consumers search at no cost; 𝛾 = 1 means the 
market is completely immobile where all consumers have 
positive search costs (Diamond, 1971). Further, among 
the 𝛼𝑖 buyers that first visit firm 𝑖, 𝛼𝑖𝛾 are high- search-
cost buyers and 𝛼𝑖(1 − 𝛾)  are shoppers. Table 1 
summarizes the notation, some to be defined later. 
4 Analysis 
The model is solved using backward induction. First, we 
examine buyers’ behavior, then we discuss the firms’ 
pricing strategies, and, finally, we identify the firms’ 
optimal advertising decisions. 
4.1 Buyer Behavior 
Buyers search for the product they desire after e-tailers set 
their advertising levels and prices. Recall that e-tailer 𝑖 
randomly sets a price from 𝐹𝑖(𝑝). Suppose the support of 
𝐹𝑖(𝑝)  is 𝑃𝑖 , with upper bound 𝑢𝑖  and lower bound 𝑙𝑖 . 
𝐹𝑖(𝑝) degenerates into a single mass in the case of a pure 
strategy. 𝑓𝑖(𝑝)  is the probability density function 
associated with 𝐹𝑖(𝑝). Obviously, 𝑢𝑖 ≤ 𝑟, since no firm 
charges a price that nobody accepts. All buyers are 
assumed to be risk-neutral and have the same belief 
regarding 𝛽𝑖 and 𝐹𝑖(⋅); however, they do not know the 
association between a firm and its strategy before they 
observe any price.
 
                                                          
2 When consumers are reached by both firms, it can mean 
that the two firms’ ads appear in the same media at the same 
time or that the two firms are shown in the same search 
results page. In these cases, we assume that the order of the 
firms’ ads/places is random and thus that the firms have 
equal chances of being visited by consumers first. 
3 One could argue that buyers could go to many other 
websites to check the ads listed elsewhere and infer 
advertising levels. Yet, we believe that since there are many 
other ads and sources of information and the same e-tailer 
may design ads differently for different websites, the high 
mental cost of processing this large amount of information 
is not commensurate with the benefits associated with 
knowing the firms’ identities. 
4 The search cost we define here can also be understood as 
marginal search cost; for simplicity, we refer to it as search 
cost. 




Table 1. Notation 
𝛽𝑖 advertising intensity of firm 𝑖 
𝛽𝑖
∗ the equilibrium advertising intensity of firm 𝑖 
𝐴(𝛽) the advertising cost of intensity 𝛽 
𝛼𝑖 the number of buyers that first visit firm 𝑖 
𝛼 the number of buyers that first visit the more advertised firm 
𝛾 the proportion of high-search-cost buyers 
𝑟 the reservation price of buyers 
𝑐 the search cost of high-search-cost buyers 
𝐹𝑖(𝑝) the cumulative distribution function of firm 𝑖’s pricing strategy 
𝑓𝑖(𝑝) the probability density function of firm 𝑖’s pricing strategy 
𝑃𝑖  the support of firm 𝑖’s pricing strategy 
𝑙𝑖 the lower bound of 𝑃𝑖  
𝑙 the common lower bound of both firms’ pricing strategy 
𝑢𝑖 the upper bound of 𝑃𝑖  
𝑢 the common upper bound of both firms’ pricing strategy 
𝑢∗ the upper bound of price due to buyers’ search behavior 
𝑚 the probability mass at 𝑢 
𝜋𝑖 the revenue of firm 𝑖 
𝜋𝑖
𝑛 the net profit of firm 𝑖 
𝑏𝑖(𝛽𝑗) firm 𝑖’s best advertising intensity for given intensity 𝛽𝑗 
𝜃 advertising cost parameter 
𝛽𝑖𝑠
∗  the equilibrium advertising level in the sequential game 
𝛽𝑖𝑐
∗  the equilibrium advertising level in the simultaneous game 
 
We know that both shoppers and high-search-cost 
buyers get the price information at the first e-tailer they 
visit at zero cost. Both types maximize their expected 
payoff by comparing their benefits and the costs of 
searching for the second e-tailer. 
Suppose a buyer first visits firm 𝑖 and observes price 
𝑧. She updates her belief about from which firm she 
observes 𝑧 according to Bayes’ rule,  
 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝑖 = 𝑘) =
𝑓𝑘(𝑧)
𝑓1(𝑧)+𝑓2(𝑧)
, 𝑘 = 1,2. (1) 
Note that if a price is only charged by one firm, a buyer 
who has observed that price is able to infer the firm’s 
strategy with certainty. 
The buyer’s expected benefit from searching for the 
next firm 𝑗, 𝑗 ≠ 𝑖, is 












For a shopper, since the expected benefit of searching 
for the next e-tailer is positive and the cost is zero, the 
shopper will search both firms unless the first firm’s 
price is equal to min{𝑙1, 𝑙2}. We shall later show in 
Lemmas 3 and 4 that 𝑙1 = 𝑙2, and that the event that 
either firm charges the lower bound equals zero in 
equilibrium. Therefore, a shopper will buy from the 
firm that offers the lowest price with a probability that 
equals 1. 
For a high-search-cost buyer, an additional search is 
worthwhile if the expected benefit exceeds the search 
cost 𝑐, that is, 𝑆(𝑧) > 𝑐. We assume high- search-cost 
buyers choose either firm with equal probability when 
presented with equal prices and choose to stop the 
search when indifferent between stopping and 
continuing to search. Lemma 1 below shows that in 
equilibrium high- search-cost buyers who happen to 
draw the highest possible price (i.e., the upper limit of 
the price range) will not search again (see Appendix 
for proof). 
Lemma 1:  𝑆(𝑢𝑖) ≤ 𝑐, 𝑖 = 1,2. 
We further prove that for any price 𝑧 < 𝑢𝑖, we have 
𝑆(𝑧) ≤ 𝑐 (see the proof for Lemma 2 in the Appendix), 
which means that for a high-search- cost buyer, the 
cost of searching for the second e-tailer always 
outweighs the benefits, no matter what price is 
observed at the first e-tailer. Thus, high-search-cost 
A Game-Theoretic Analysis of Online Retailing  
864 
 
buyers visit and purchase from the first e-tailer, while 
shoppers keep searching. Lemma 2 summarizes the 
behavior of both types of buyers. 
Lemma 2: High-search-cost buyers buy from the first 
firm they visit; shoppers buy from the firm that 
offers the lower price. 
The intuition is as follows: if high-search-cost buyers 
search for the second e-tailer, they will end up buying 
from the e-tailer with the lower price— just like the 
shoppers—which means that the firm charging the 
lower price will always win the entire market, 
rendering any mixed-strategy pricing suboptimal. 
Therefore, in equilibrium, the e-tailers will adopt 
pricing strategies that ensure that high-search-cost 
buyers purchase at the first e-tailer they visit. 
4.2 Pricing Strategies 
In this subsection, we discuss the firms’ optimal 
pricing strategies. Recall that firm 𝑖’s pricing strategy 
is described by a cumulative distribution function 
𝐹𝑖(𝑝), with support 𝑃𝑖 = [𝑙𝑖 , 𝑢𝑖]. We first characterize 
the properties that the pricing strategies must satisfy. 
Lemma 3 shows that the lower bounds of the price 
ranges for the two firms are equal. In Lemma 4 we 
prove that the support of the price range 𝑃𝑖  is 
continuous and that there is no probability mass at any 
price below min{𝑢1, 𝑢2}, which implies that 𝐹𝑖(𝑝) is 
continuous. 
Lemma 3: The lower bounds of 𝑃1 and 𝑃2 are equal—
i.e., 𝑙1 = 𝑙2 ≡ 𝑙. 
Lemma 4: On the interval [𝑙, min{𝑢1, 𝑢2}) , the 
support of the price range 𝑃𝑖  and the pricing 
strategy 𝐹𝑖(𝑝), 𝑖 = 1,2 are both continuous. 
Next, we find the relationship between the two firms’ 
pricing strategies. The equilibrium revenue of firm 𝑖 is 
denoted by 𝜋𝑖. Given equilibrium strategy 𝐹𝑗(𝑝), firm 
𝑖’s expected revenue is:  
𝜋𝑖 = 𝑝𝑞𝑖
= 𝑝 (𝛼𝑖𝛾 + (1 − 𝛾) (1 − 𝐹𝑗(𝑝))). 
(3) 
 The first component in the parenthesis, 𝛼𝑖𝛾 , is the 
number of high-search-cost buyers who visit firm 𝑖 
first. The second component, (1 − 𝛾)(1 − 𝐹𝑗(𝑝))  is 
the expected number of shoppers, calculated by the 
number of all shoppers multiplied by the probability of 
firm 𝑗  charging a price higher than 𝑝 , because 
shoppers, after visiting both firms, will generally 
choose to buy from firm 𝑖 if 𝑖 charges a lower price.5 
                                                          
5 In this paper, we focus on the price factor in 
consumer’s purchase decions.  
Note that firm 𝑗  does not have a mass at 𝑝 , so the 
probability that firm 𝑗 also charges 𝑝 is zero. 





(1 − 𝛾 + 𝛼𝑖𝛾 −
𝜋𝑖
𝑝
) ,  𝑙 ≤ 𝑝 < min{𝑢1, 𝑢2}. 
(4) 
Note that when 𝑝 = 𝑙, 𝐹𝑗(𝑙) = 0. Thus, we have 𝜋𝑖 =
𝑙(1 − 𝛾 + 𝛼𝑖𝛾) . Therefore, firm 𝑗 ’s equilibrium 
















Thus, we have the following lemma: 
Lemma 5: When 𝛼𝑖 ≥ 𝛼𝑗, 𝐹𝑖(𝑝) ≤ 𝐹𝑗(𝑝). 
Lemma 5 states that the first-order condition of the 
price charged by the firm with more initial traffic (i.e., 
the more advertised firm) stochastically dominates that 
of the other firm. This means that the more advertised 
firm is more likely to charge a higher price. 
The next lemma shows that the price ranges of the two 
firms have the same upper bound. 
Lemma 6: The upper bounds of 𝑃1  and 𝑃2  are equal 
(i.e., 𝑢1 = 𝑢2 ≡ 𝑢). 
From Lemmas 3 and 6, we know that the two firms 
have the same price range (i.e., 𝑃1 = 𝑃2 = [𝑙, 𝑢] ). 
Since only one firm could have a mass at 𝑢 , and 
according to Lemma 5, 𝐹𝑖(𝑝) < 𝐹𝑗(𝑝) when 𝛼𝑖 > 𝛼𝑗, 
the firm that has a mass must be the one with more 
initial traffic. To simplify notation, without loss of 
generality, we assume firm 𝑖 to be the more advertised 
in the rest of this subsection (i.e., 𝛽𝑖 ≥ 𝛽𝑗 and thus 𝛼 =
𝛼𝑖 ≥ 𝛼𝑗). 
To specify 𝐹𝑖(𝑝) , we need to determine 𝑙  and 𝑢 . 
Adopting a mixed strategy for pricing means that the 
expected revenue remains the same for any price 
charged. For firm 𝑖 , charging 𝑢  yields an expected 
equilibrium revenue of 𝜋𝑖 = 𝑢𝛼𝛾 ; charging 𝑙  yields 
𝜋𝑖 = 𝑙(𝛼𝛾 + 1 − 𝛾). Thus, 𝑙 = 𝑢
𝛼𝛾
1−𝛾+𝛼𝛾
. So, we only 
need to determine 𝑢 , the upper bound of the price 
range. There are two mechanisms that limit the highest 
price a firm can charge. First, a firm cannot charge a 
higher price than the reservation price, so 𝑢 ≤ 𝑟 . 
Second, a firm cannot charge a price so high that even 
the high-search-cost buyers would search for a second 




e-tailer. Formally, define 𝑢∗ , such that 𝑆𝑖(𝑢
∗) = 𝑐 . 
Since  
 𝑐 = 𝑆𝑖(𝑢



























Therefore, the upper bound of the price range should 
be 𝑟 or 𝑢∗, whichever is lower. 
Based on the above analysis, we characterize the 
equilibrium pricing strategies in Proposition 1. 
Proposition 1: Suppose 𝛽𝑖 ≥ 𝛽𝑗 , and thus 𝛼 = 𝛼𝑖 =
1+𝛽𝑖−𝛽𝑗
2
. There is a unique mixed-strategy pricing 
equilibrium characterized by:  
 𝐹𝑖(𝑝) =
{






)   𝑙 ≤ 𝑝 < 𝑢











)  𝑙 ≤ 𝑝 < 𝑢
0   𝑝 < 𝑙
, 
(7) 
where 𝑙 = 𝑢
𝛼𝛾
1−𝛾+𝛼𝛾







Proposition 1 reveals some interesting features of the 
firms’ pricing decisions. First, we find that buyers’ 
search behavior influences the firms’ pricing power. In 
this mixed-strategy pricing equilibrium, the highest 
price a firm can charge is not only bounded by the 
buyers’ maximum willingness to pay, but may also be 
restricted by the buyers’ search cost. In the literature of 
pricing games with buyers of different mobility, the 
upper bound of the price in an asymmetric mixed-
strategy equilibrium is commonly shown to be defined 
by the monopoly price (i.e., the reservation price) 𝑟 
(Narasimhan, 1988; Raju, Srinivasan, & Lal, 1990). In 
our model, however, the upper bound of the price range 
is determined by the minimum of 𝑟 and 𝑢∗, the latter 
being a function of the high-search-cost buyers’ search 
cost 𝑐. As long as 𝑟 > 𝑢∗, the higher the search cost 𝑐, 
the higher the upper bound of the price range. This 
implies that when the search cost for the high-search-
cost buyers increases, firms can potentially charge a 
higher price. 
The price range also depends on the composition of 
buyers. When all the buyers are the high-search-cost 
type (i.e., 𝛾 = 1, then 𝑢 = 𝑙 = 𝑟), both firms charge 
the reservation price, consistent with Diamond (1971). 
However, when the proportion of shoppers increases, 
𝑢∗ declines (𝑢∗′(𝛾) > 0), and when 𝑢∗ is lower than 𝑟, 
the upper bound is determined by 𝑢∗. When 𝛾 is close 
to zero (i.e., most buyers are shoppers) the upper bound 
𝑢  has the lowest value, 𝑐 . The lower bound 𝑙  also 
decreases as 𝛾 declines. This suggests that when the 
percentage of shoppers increases, the firms have less 
pricing power. 
Second, for any price below 𝑢, the two firms have the 
same mixed-strategy pricing scheme. We know that as 
long as 𝛼 > 0.5, the more advertised firm is the only 
one that has a probability mass at 𝑢  . Define this 
probability mass as 𝑚. From Proposition 1, we have 




. By the Bayesian update 
rule, if a buyer observes a price of 𝑢, she can infer with 
certainty that the current firm is the more advertised 
firm. Interestingly, at any other price below 𝑢 , 
𝐹𝑖(𝑝|𝑝 < 𝑢) = 𝐹𝑗(𝑝), which means that firm 𝑖 adopts 
the same pricing strategy as firm 𝑗 at any price below 
𝑢. Therefore, if a buyer gets any price 𝑝, 𝑝 < 𝑢, it is 
equally possible that it comes from either firm. 
Based on Proposition 1, we offer the following 
corollary regarding the expected price, sales quantities, 
and revenues of the two firms: 




The expected prices, sales quantities, and 
revenues of firm 𝑖 and 𝑗 are given by:  















































 𝜋𝑖 = 𝑢𝛼𝛾, (12) 




where 𝑙 = 𝑢
𝛼𝛾
1−𝛾+𝛼𝛾







Based on Corollary 1, it can be proven that firm 𝑖, the 
more advertised firm, has a higher expected price, a 
higher expected quantity, and higher revenues. We can 











implies that when the two firms choose the same level 
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of advertising, they will have the same expected price 
and revenue. 
It is instructive to analyze how equilibrium prices are 
affected by traffic flow. It is easy to verify 
𝑑𝑢∗
𝑑𝛼
> 0. So, 
when 𝑢 = 𝑢∗, 
𝑑𝑢∗
𝑑𝛼
≥ 0 (note that 𝑢 is not differentiable 
at the kink point 𝑟 = 𝑢∗(𝛼) ). Similarly,  
𝑑𝑙
𝑑𝛼
> 0 . 
Therefore, the upper and lower bounds of the price 
range increase with the skewness of traffic flow, except 
when the upper bound is capped by the reservation 
price. Based on the results in Corollary 1, it can be 
easily proven that  
𝑑𝐸𝑝𝑖
𝑑𝛼
> 0 and 
𝑑𝐸𝑝𝑗
𝑑𝛼
> 0 when 𝑢 =
𝑢∗, which suggests that more unbalanced traffic flow 
leads to higher expected prices of both firms, relaxing 
price competition. We offer the following corollary: 
Corollary 2: More skewed traffic flow leads to higher 
expected market prices—i.e., 
𝑑𝐸𝑝𝑖
𝑑𝛼
> 0   and 
𝑑𝐸𝑝𝑗
𝑑𝛼
> 0 . 
Our model generalizes Arbatskaya (2007) and Xu et al. 
(2011). In their work, all buyers follow the same search 
order and the prices decline with the order. We show 
that the buyers may have different search order, but the 
firm that more buyers visit first is more likely to set a 
higher price than the other firm. 
It is also worthwhile to analyze the sales quantity. 
From Corollary 1, we obtain 
𝑑𝐸𝑞𝑖
𝑑𝛼
> 0, which means 
more skewed traffic leads to more sales for the more 
advertised firm. We can see that firm 𝑖  sells to 𝛼𝛾 
high-search-cost buyers and its expected share of 
shoppers is given by 
(1−𝛼𝛾)(1−𝛾)
2(1−𝛾+𝛼𝛾)
. The proportion of 




monotonously increases with 𝛼 , from 𝛾  (when 𝛼 =
0.5 ) to 
2𝛾
1+𝛾2
 (when 𝛼 = 1 ). This means more 
unbalanced traffic results in firm 𝑖 selling more to the 
high-search-cost buyers and less to the shoppers, and 
the overall effect is higher sales volume. Also, 
note 𝐸𝑞𝑖 < 𝛼; that is, the sales volume is less than the 
traffic flow initially directed to firm 𝑖. 
From Corollary 1, we find  
𝑑𝐸𝑞𝑗
𝑑𝛼
< 0. Firm 𝑗  sells to 
(1 − 𝛼)𝛾  high-search-cost buyers and its expected 
share of shoppers. Firm 𝑗’s share of shoppers consists 
two parts: the share when firm 𝑖 prices at 𝑢: 𝑚(1 − 𝛾), 








monotonously decreases with 𝛼 , from 𝛾  (when 𝛼 =
0.5) to 0 (when 𝛼 = 1), which implies that when the 
advertising (traffic) gap between the two firms widens, 
the less advertised firm 𝑗 is less likely to sell to high-
search-cost buyers and more likely to sell to shoppers, 
but the overall effect is lower sales quantity. Note that 
𝐸𝑞𝑗 > 1 − 𝛼; that is, the sales volume is greater than 
the traffic flow initially directed to Firm 2. In 
summary, we offer the following corollary: 
Corollary 3: More skewed traffic flow leads to a 
higher sales quantity for the more advertised firm 
and lower sales quantity for the less advertised 
firm (i.e., 𝑑𝐸𝑞𝑖/𝑑𝛼 > 0 and 𝑑𝐸𝑞𝑗/𝑑𝛼 < 0) and 
makes the buyers of the former firm more skewed 
to high-search- cost buyers and the buyers of the 




Figure 1. Partition of the Monotonicity of 𝝅𝟐(𝜶)  
 




We now discuss the revenue of the firms. Since more 
skewed traffic flow leads to both higher expected price 
and higher quantity of firm 𝑖 , the revenue of firm 𝑖 
increases. However, higher skewness of initial traffic 
(an increase in 𝛼) has two countervailing effects on 
firm 𝑗’s revenue: the relaxed price competition effect 
(a higher expected price) and the sales reduction effect 
(a lower sales quantity). The next corollary states that 
𝜋𝑗(𝛼)  can only be of increasing, unimodal, or 
decreasing shape, and Figure 1 shows the property of 
𝜋𝑗(𝛼) for specific parameter ranges (see Appendix for 
proof): 
Corollary 4: 𝜋𝑗(𝛼)  can only be of increasing, 
unimodal or decreasing shape. 
In Figure 1, the parameter space 𝛾 ⊗ 𝑟 is divided into 
three regimes, separated by black solid lines. Regime I 






< 𝛾 ≤ 𝛾∗  and 
𝑟 ≥ 𝑢∗(1) =
(1−𝛾)𝑐
1−𝛾+𝛾ln(𝛾)
 (𝛾∗ ≈ 0.529). In this regime, 
𝜋𝑗(𝛼) is an increasing function of 𝛼. The intuition is as 
follows: as the initial traffic gap widens, the sales 
quantity of firm 𝑗  decreases, but because there are 
more shoppers (𝛾  is low), the decrease is relatively 
modest and the higher price (on average) can more than 
compensate for the lost sales, resulting in higher 
revenues. In other words, the relaxed price competition 
effect outweighs the sales reduction effect. 
In Regime III, where 𝛾 ≥
2
3
 and 𝑟 ≤ 𝑢∗(0.5), 𝜋𝑗(𝛼) is 
a decreasing function of 𝛼.6 Here most buyers have 
high search costs and choose to buy from the first store 
they visit, thus when significantly more buyers are 
directed to firm 𝑖, the sales reduction effect outweighs 
the relaxed price competition effect, negatively 
affecting firm 𝑗’s revenue. 
Regime II is defined by 
3−√5
2
< 𝛾 ≤ 𝛾∗ and 𝑟 < 𝑢∗(1), 
or 𝛾∗ < 𝛾 <
2
3
, or 𝛾 ≥
2
3






. In this regime, firm 𝑗’s revenue first 
increases and then decreases with more skewed traffic 
to firm 𝑖 . This suggests that for parameters in this 
range, there is an optimal traffic flow that balances the 
relaxed price competition effect and the sales reduction 
effect 
 and yields the maximal revenue for firm 𝑗. In other 
words, the effect of traffic flow pattern on firm 𝑗’s 
revenue is moderated by the overall market mobility. 
4.3 Advertising Levels 
We now discuss firms’ advertising decisions. Recall 
that the number of buyers that first visit firm 𝑖 is 𝛼𝑖 =
1+𝛽𝑖−𝛽𝑗
2
 and that 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛼𝑗 = 1 . From Corollary 1, we 
see that firm 𝑖’s expected revenues from selling the 




 when 𝛽𝑖 < 𝛽𝑗 . A firm’s net payoff, or 
profit, 𝜋𝑖
𝑛  is its revenues 𝜋𝑖  minus the advertising 
costs. Thus, the profit of firm 𝑖, 𝑖 = 1,2, can be written 
as:
 
Equation (14)  
 
𝜋𝑖
𝑛(𝛽𝑖 ; 𝛽𝑗) = {
𝑢𝛼𝑖𝛾 − 𝐴(𝛽𝑖) = 𝑢𝛾
1+𝛽𝑖−𝛽𝑗
2
− 𝐴(𝛽𝑖), 𝛽𝑖 ≥ 𝛽𝑗
𝑢(1−𝛼𝑖)𝛾(1−𝛾+𝛼𝑖𝛾)
1−𝛼𝑖𝛾





− 𝐴(𝛽𝑖), 𝛽𝑖 < 𝛽𝑗
.  
   
 
Proposition 2: The advertising game does not have a 
pure strategy symmetric equilibrium. 
The intuition behind Proposition 2 is that the payoff 
function is not quasi-concave at 𝛽𝑖 = 𝛽𝑗 , so each firm 
has an incentive to deviate by increasing or decreasing 
its advertising level at the diagonal of the payoff 
functions. 
To find an asymmetric equilibrium, we first define 
𝑏𝑖(𝛽𝑗), the best response of firm 𝑖 to a given level of 
𝛽𝑗, in the following lemma. 
                                                          
6 Note 𝑢∗(0.5) is a function of 𝛾 with 𝛼 = 0.5. If 𝑟 <
𝑢∗(0.5), the equilibrium price must be bounded by 𝑟, that is 
𝑢 = 𝑟. 𝑢∗(1) is a function of 𝛾 with 𝛼 = 1. If 𝑟 > 𝑢∗(1), 
the equilibrium price is only bounded by 𝑢∗ (never by 𝑟), 
Lemma 7. Firm 𝑖’s best response function to firm 𝑗’s 

















− 𝐴(𝛽𝑖)   when 
𝛽𝑗 > ?̂?, 
that is 𝑢 = 𝑢∗. If 𝑢∗(0.5) ≤ 𝑟 ≤ 𝑢∗(1), the equilibrium 
price is first bounded 𝑢∗ and then by 𝑟 as 𝛼 increases. 




























Figure 2 illustrates the best response functions, 𝑏𝑖(𝛽𝑗) 
(shown in solid lines) and 𝑏𝑗(𝛽𝑖) (dotted lines). We 
focus on the explanation of 𝑏𝑖(𝛽𝑗) , knowing that 
𝑏𝑗(𝛽𝑖) is symmetric to 𝑏𝑖(𝛽𝑗). Figure 2a illustrates a 
typical graph of 𝑏𝑖(𝛽𝑗) and 𝑏𝑗(𝛽𝑖), where 𝑢 = 𝑢
∗ and 
𝑏𝑖(𝛽𝑗), 𝑏𝑗(𝛽𝑖) are not zero. The most prominent feature 
of 𝑏𝑖(𝛽𝑗)  is that it is discontinuous
7  and has two 
regimes: when 𝛽𝑗 < ?̂? or firm 𝑗 advertises moderately, 
firm 𝑖 chooses a high advertising level, but when 𝛽𝑗 >
?̂?  or firm 𝑗 advertises intensely, firm 𝑖  switches to a 
much lower advertising level. This means that firms 
avoid a head-to-head advertising war. Furthermore, 
when 𝛽𝑗 is lower than the threshold level ?̂? and firm 𝑖 
is the one with higher advertising level, firm 𝑖 
gradually advertises less as firm 𝑗  increases its 
advertising level ( 𝑏′𝑖(𝛽𝑗) < 0 ). The intuition is as 
follows: in this regime, firm 𝑖 is advertising intensely, 
and due to higher marginal advertising cost, it is costly 
to advertise even more; thus it is in the best interests of 
firm 𝑖 to play dovish, advertising less as its competitor 
advertises more. On the other hand, when 𝛽𝑗 > ?̂?, firm 
𝑖, the one with a lower advertising level, increases its 
own advertising level as firm 𝑗  advertises more, 
though to a lesser extent than firm 𝑗 (0 < 𝑏′𝑖(𝛽𝑗) < 1). 
Firm 𝑖  plays hawkish in this regime because it has 
lower marginal advertising cost, and thus advertising 
more is worthwhile to attract more traffic. 
Figure 2b illustrates the case where 𝑢 = 𝑢∗ , but 𝑏𝑖 
takes the corner solution 0 for some 𝛽𝑗 > ?̂? . In this 
case, 𝑏𝑖(𝛽𝑗)  has three regimes: when 𝛽𝑗 < ?̂? , firm 𝑖 
chooses a high advertising level; when ?̂? < 𝛽𝑗 ≤ ?̃? , 
firm 𝑖 does not advertise at all (𝑏𝑖(𝛽𝑗) = 0); and when 
𝛽𝑗 > ?̃?, firm 𝑖 chooses to advertise at a low, positive 
level. It is interesting that for certain parameters, in 
response to the competitor’s medium level of 
advertising, it may be optimal for a firm not to 
advertise at all. 
Figure 2c illustrates the case where the upper bound of 
price range 𝑢 can be restricted by 𝑟. In this chart, when 
𝛽𝑗 ≤ 𝛽1̃ , 𝑢 = 𝑟 , and 𝛽𝑖  does not change with 𝛽𝑗 
                                                          
7 If 𝑏𝑖 is continuous, it guarantees a symmetric pure strategy 
equilibrium. 
(𝑏′𝑖(𝛽𝑗) = 0). When 𝛽1̃ < 𝛽𝑗 ≤ 𝛽2̃, it is the case where 
𝑢 = 𝑟 = 𝑢∗ . In this interval, for an increase in its 
competitor’s advertising level, firm 𝑖 responds with an 
equal increase in advertising level ( 𝑏′𝑖(𝛽𝑗) = 1 ), 
resulting in the same traffic flows, hence the same 
revenues from product sales but lower profits for both, 
due to higher advertising costs. If 𝛽2̃ < 𝛽𝑗 < ?̂?, then 
𝑢 = 𝑢∗, and firm 𝑖 actually reduces its own advertising 
when firm 𝑗 increases its advertising level, which is 
similar to 𝑏𝑖(𝛽𝑗) in Regime I in Figures 2a and 2b. 
𝑏𝑖(𝛽𝑗) is also discontinuous at ?̂? , which means that 
firm 𝑖 switches to a lower advertising level when firm 
𝑗’s advertising is sufficiently high, just like the cases 
shown in Figures 2a and 2b. In the range ?̂? < 𝛽𝑗 ≤ 𝛽3̃, 
where 𝑢 = 𝑢∗  still holds, 𝑏𝑖(𝛽𝑗)  again has similar 
properties as it does in Regime II in Figure 2a and 
Regime III in Figure 2b. When 𝛽3̃ < 𝛽𝑗 ≤ 𝛽4̃, we have 
𝑢 = 𝑟 = 𝑢∗, and similar to the case where 𝛽1̃ < 𝛽𝑗 ≤
𝛽2̃, 𝛽𝑖 increases with 𝛽𝑗, and their difference remains 
the same. Finally, when 𝛽𝑗 > 𝛽4̃, again 𝑢 = 𝑟, but now 
that firm 𝑖’s advertising level is low, it advertises more 
in response to firm 𝑗 ’s increase in 𝛽𝑗 , though to a 
smaller extent. 
We know that each intersection of the best response 
functions 𝑏𝑖(𝛽𝑗)  and 𝑏𝑗(𝛽𝑖)  is an equilibrium. In 
Figures 2a, 2b, and 2c, the intersections of the solid 
lines and dotted lines are equilibria. We prove that 
𝑏𝑖(𝛽𝑗)  and 𝑏𝑗(𝛽𝑖)  must intersect and thus offer the 
following proposition. 
Proposition 3. The advertising game has paired pure 
strategy asymmetric equilibria. The firms always 
choose different advertising levels. 
Due to the ex ante symmetry of the firms, the best 
responses of the firms are symmetric. In Proposition 3, 
we prove that the game has either a pair of pure 
strategy asymmetric equilibria (i.e., the intersections of 
𝑏𝑖(𝛽𝑗)  and 𝑏𝑗(𝛽𝑖)  in Figures 2a and 2b) or paired 
continuum asymmetric equilibria—i.e., the two 
segments where 𝑏𝑖(𝛽𝑗) and 𝑏𝑗(𝛽𝑖) coincide in Figures 
2c. We use asterisks to show equilibrium results. 
Without loss of generality, we label the firm with the 
higher equilibrium advertising level as Firm 1 and the 
other as Firm 2 throughout the rest of the paper. 
Therefore, in equilibrium, 𝛽1
∗ > 𝛽2
∗  and the initial 












a. General form of the best response function 
 
b. One optimal advertising  level is zero                          c. Existence of continuum of equilibria 
Figure 2. The Best Response Functions 
Figure 3 shows the equilibrium advertising strategies 
in the space of 𝑟 and 𝛾. The space is partitioned into 
six regions. In Regions I and II, one firm chooses not 
to advertise (𝛽2
∗ = 0). This is because in these regions 
𝛾 is low (i.e., the market mobility is high), and since 
there are more shoppers than high-search-cost buyers, 
the firms choose different strategies: one chooses to 
advertise and the other chooses not to, focusing on 
charging a lower average price instead. In Regions III 
and IV, since market mobility is low, to attract high-
search-cost buyers both firms choose to advertise.  
In Regions II and III, the reservation price 𝑟 
determines the upper bound of the firms’ pricing range. 
In Regions I and IV, the reservation price 𝑟 is high; 
however, the highest price that the firms charge does 
not equal 𝑟 , but instead is bounded by 𝑢∗ . This 
suggests that buyers’ search behavior limits the firms’ 
pricing power.  
Regions V  and VI , nested between Regions I , II , III , 
and IV, is the space where there exists a continuum of 
equilibria. In Region V , where 𝛾  is low (i.e., the 
mobility is high), 𝛽2
∗ = 0 is included in the continuum 
of equilibria, while in Region VI, both firms choose 
positive advertising levels in any equilibrium of the 
continuum. We summarize these results in the 
following corollary: 
Corollary 5. When the market mobility is sufficiently 
high, one firm willingly chooses not to advertise 
(i.e., 𝛽2
∗ = 0 ); otherwise both firms choose to 
advertise (i.e., 𝛽1
∗, 𝛽2
∗ > 0). For a narrow area in 








Figure 3. Partition of the Equilibrium Advertising Strategies 
One unique aspect of this model is that an asymmetric 
equilibrium may persist in an ex ante symmetric, static 
game. In the literature, an asymmetric equilibrium is 
usually driven by exogenous asymmetric factors, such 
as store positioning (Rajiv, Dutta, & Dhar, 2002) price 
formats (Lal & Rao, 1997), and product availability 
(Janssen & Non, 2009), or exists in a dynamic setting 
(Doraszelski & Markovich, 2007). Our results show 
that, in equilibrium, firms can choose different 
strategies to differentiate. 
5 Mobility, Costs and Equilibrium 
In this section, we examine how market characteristics 
and information costs affect firm strategies. We refer 
to the firm with the higher advertising level in 
equilibrium as Firm 1 and the other as Firm 2. Recall 
that in Corollary 5, we show that there is a continuum 
of asymmetric equilibria for a narrow parameter range. 
In this section, we assume that in the case of a 
continuum of equilibria, firms choose the equilibrium 
that has the lowest advertising levels and hence highest 
payoffs. 
5.1 The Effect of Market Mobility 
We first examine the effect of market mobility on the 
equilibrium advertising levels and, in turn, traffic 
allocation and market outcomes. 
Recall that 𝛾 measures the proportion of high- search-
cost buyers, and thus higher 𝛾 implies lower market 








  and 
𝜕𝛼∗
𝜕𝛾
  are summarized in the following 
proposition. 
Proposition 4. 𝛽1
∗  first increases with 𝛾 , then may 
decrease during a narrow range of 𝛾 , and then 
resumes increasing with 𝛾, albeit at a lower rate 
than 𝛽2
∗  does. 𝛽2
∗  is zero when 𝛾  is below a 
threshold value, beyond which 𝛽2
∗ is positive and 
always increases with 𝛾. The traffic to the more 
advertised firm, 𝛼∗ , is most skewed at an 
intermediate value of 𝛾. 
Note that 𝛽1
∗(𝛾)  only decreases when (𝑟, 𝛾)  is in 
Region V  or VI  of Figure 3. Therefore 𝛽1
∗(𝛾)  strictly 
increases when 𝑟 < 𝑐 (the parameters fall in Regions II 
and III). Figure 4 illustrates 𝛽1
∗(𝛾), 𝛽2
∗(𝛾) and 𝛼∗(𝛾), 
where 𝑟 > 𝑐, so that 𝛽1
∗(𝛾) has a decreasing interval. 
 
Figure 4. Advertising Levels and Traffic Flow   




       
a. The expected equilibrium prices               b. The expected equilibrium profits 
Figure 5. The Equilibrium Market Outcome 
When 𝛾 = 0, neither firm advertises. As 𝛾 increases, 
one firm starts to advertise more, resulting in more 
skewed traffic flow. The skewness in advertising levels 
(traffic flow), represented by 𝛼∗, peaks in the medium 
range of 𝛾. As 𝛾 further increases, the other firm starts 
to advertise, and does so more aggressively, narrowing 
the gap in the advertising levels. When 𝛾 = 1, both 
firms choose the same, highest advertising intensity. 
This shows that the difference in advertising strategy 
is small when the market is more uniform (𝛾 is either 
small or large); and the firms have the most unbalanced 
strategies when the market is more heterogeneous 
because they can best differentiate by targeting 
different segments. 
Figure 5a depicts how the expected equilibrium prices 
change with 𝛾  and Figure 5b the firms’ profits. In 
Figure 5a, the dashed curve represents each firm’s 






) , when 
advertising is not available thus neither advertises. 𝐸𝑝1 






), and converge 
to the monopoly price 𝑟  as 𝛾  approaches 1. The 






)  is 
the largest in the medium range of 𝛾 , when price 
competition is most relaxed. That is because, as shown 
previously, 𝛼∗ peaks in the medium range of 𝛾. 
In Figure 5b, the dashed curve represents the profit 
each firm earns, 
𝑢𝛾
2
, again when neither firm advertises. 
𝑢𝛾
2
 increases monotonically with 𝛾, which implies that 
without advertising costs, the less mobile the market is, 
                                                          




𝑛(0; 0) = 𝜋1(0; 0). Since 𝛽2
∗ = 0 is a corner solution, 
the higher the profits that firms can make. This is 
because, as the proportion of high-search-cost buyers 
increases, firms can charge a higher average price and 
thus earn higher profits. The solid lines represent the 
firms’ net profits. Both firms’ profits are higher than 
𝑢𝛾
2
 when 𝛾 is relatively low. Moreover, it can be proven 
that when only one firm advertises, both firms earn net 




Corollary 6. When market mobility is sufficiently 
high and in equilibrium and only one firm 
advertises, both firms’ profits are higher than in 
the case where neither firm has the option to 
advertise.8 
Corollary 6 suggests that the opportunity to advertise, 
even though costly, can benefit firms. Without 
advertisements, firms must compete in terms of price. 
The option to advertise allows the firms to differentiate 
along two dimensions: one firm may choose to 
advertise and charge a high price, while the other 
chooses to charge a low price and does not advertise at 
all (note that such equilibria exist only when the market 
mobility is high). This results in higher profits for both 
firms than they would earn in the case of price 
competition without any advertisement. Another 
interesting result is that, when 𝛾 is low and one firm 
does not advertise, the firm that advertises more does 
not necessarily earn higher profits. In Figure 5(b), 𝜋1
𝑛 
could be lower than 𝜋2
𝑛 for some 𝛾 when 𝛾 is low. This 
means that under these market conditions, none of the 




∗ |𝛽2∗=0 ≤ 0. So 𝜋2
𝑛(0; 𝛽1
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It is interesting to further discuss social welfare. In our 
model, since consumers always buy, the total social 
welfare remains unchanged, with or without the option 
of advertising. Based on Figure 5a, consumers always 
pay higher prices when advertising is available. 
Therefore, consumer surplus is reduced by the 
advertising option. When the market mobility is 
sufficiently high, firms earn higher profits than they 
would without any advertising, and thus producer 
surplus increases. Note that the firms pay to advertise, 
therefore the reduction in consumer surplus is divided 
between the firms and the advertising media. 
When 𝛾 is high, we can prove that the more advertised 
firm has higher profits than the less advertised firm. In 
Corollary 1, we show that the more advertised firm has 
higher expected revenues than its competitor, and as 
Corollary 7 indicates below, we find that when the 
market consists of mostly high-search-cost buyers, in 
equilibrium the higher revenues more than compensate 
for the higher advertising costs of the more advertised 
firm. 
Corollary 7. When market mobility is sufficiently low, 
both firms advertise; the firm that advertises more 
makes a higher profit than the other firm. 




, the profits in the case scenario of no advertising. 
The firms, in fact, face a form of the prisoner’s dilemma: 
even though both firms could benefit if they both 
reduced their advertising intensity, neither has the 
incentive to do so. If the firms coordinate to cut their 
advertising levels to 𝛽1 = 𝛽1
∗ − 𝛽2
∗  and 𝛽2 = 𝛽2
∗ −
𝛽2
∗ = 0, each would earn a higher profit than earned in 
equilibrium (𝛽1
∗, 𝛽2
∗ ). However, without a contractual 
commitment, such a mutually beneficial agreement is 
not realized, since it does not constitute a Nash 
equilibrium. In terms of social welfare, since consumers 
are paying higher prices and firms are making lower 
profits than in a case scenario of no advertising, both the 
consumer surplus and the producer surplus are reduced 
when market mobility is sufficiently low. With the total 
welfare unchanged, the loss in consumer surplus and 
producer surplus is appropriated by advertising media. 
In sum, the firms’ profitability depends on the fierceness 
of traffic competition. When the mobile segment is 
relatively large (i. e., 𝛾  is small), the competition for 
high-search-cost buyers is not fierce. With one firm 
using the low-price strategy and the other using the 
advertising strategy, both can earn a profit higher than 
they would in the no advertising scenario. But when the 
high-search-cost segment is relatively large (i. e., 𝛾  is 
large), the differentiation strategy is less useful and 
attention competition becomes very fierce and, thus, the 
advertising costs drive both firms’ profits to levels 
strictly lower than 
𝑢𝛾
2
, the profit when neither firm 
advertises. 
5.2 The Effect of Advertising Costs 
We consider how a change in advertising costs might 
affect the equilibrium. Innovations in  Internet 
technologies are constantly creating new approaches to 
deliver ads. Advertising on new media, including 
social networking websites, such as Facebook, and 
social shopping websites, such as Pinterest, has been 
growing rapidly. These media offer new opportunities 
to reach consumers at lower costs. 
Assume the advertising cost is a function of the 
parameter 𝜃 in the form of 𝐴(𝛽; 𝜃) = 𝜃 ?̃? (𝛽), where 
𝜃  is a multiplicative component independent of the 
advertising level. 𝐴(𝛽; 𝜃) has the following properties: 
𝜕𝐴
𝜕𝜃
> 0 and 
𝜕2𝐴
𝜕𝛽𝜕𝜃
> 0, which suggests that an increases 
in 𝜃 corresponds to an increase in total and marginal 
advertising costs. Lower 𝜃 may represent shift toward 
either a more efficient advertising technology or 
toward more suppliers of advertising services. The 





< 0, 𝑖 = 1,2, except when (𝑟, 𝛾) is 







= 0 when (𝑟, 𝛾) 
is in Region V or VI. Otherwise 
𝜕𝛼∗
𝜕𝜃
< 0 when 𝛾 
is low, and the sign of 
𝜕𝛼∗
𝜕𝜃











 when 𝛾 is high. 
Proposition 5 shows that lower 𝜃 almost always causes 
firms to advertise more, except in the context of a very 
narrow parameter space (Region V  in Figure 3). 
However, its effect on the traffic is moderated by the 
market mobility. When market mobility is high, as 
long as the advertising equilibrium is not a kink point, 
lower advertising costs will lead to more skewed traffic 
and milder price competition, resulting in higher 
equilibrium prices and higher profits for both firms. 
This is because the firms adopt differentiated 
strategies, and since the firm with the advertising 
strategy now pays less  for the same advertising level, 
price competition is further alleviated and both firms 
benefit. It should be noted that, in this case, lower 
advertising costs actually lead to higher expected 
prices, making buyers worse off. 
When market mobility is low, although lower 
advertising costs still encourage both firms to advertise 
more, the degree of traffic competition is decided by 
the relative convexity at the equilibrium levels. For 
example, if ?̃? (𝛽)  is a polynomial function, ?̃? (𝛽) =
















< 0  and thus 
𝜕𝛼∗
𝜕𝜃
< 0 , which implies 
more skewed traffic, milder competition, and higher 
prices for lower 𝜃. If ?̃? (𝛽) is a logarithmic function, 










 is not 
monotonic in interval (0, 1), but increasing in (0.5, 1). 
So, if 𝛽1
∗ > 𝛽2
∗ > 0.5, lower 𝜃 will lead to less skewed 
traffic, more intense competition, and lower prices. 
Grossman and Shapiro (1984) find that lower 
advertising costs encourage firms to advertise more, 
leading to lower prices and lower profits. Our findings 
are in line with Grossman and Shapiro, in that 
decreased advertising costs lead to higher advertising 
levels, but they diverge from Grossman and Shapiro, 
in that the effect on price competition is not clear-cut, 
but moderated by market parameters. Specifically, 
when market mobility is high, lower advertising costs 
lead to higher prices. 
5.3 The Effect of Search Costs 
From Corollary 1, we can see that the search cost 𝑐 
influences the market outcome only when 𝑢 = 𝑢∗ , 
which is a function of 𝑐, and when 𝑢 = 𝑟 the search 
cost 𝑐 has no impact on the outcome. 
From Figure 3, when parameters fall into Region II, 
III, V, or VI, we know that 𝑢 = 𝑟, which means that the 
market outcome does not depend on the search cost 𝑐. 
When 𝛾 is very high, parameters always fall in Region 
III or VI. In these regions, the market is dominated by 
high-search-cost buyers and the firms could charge 
very high prices if their only concern were buyers 
shopping around. We can see this from Corollary 1, 
where 𝑢∗ can be proven to be increasing in 𝛾. In these 
regions, it is the buyers’ reservation price 𝑟 that limits 
the firms’ pricing power and determines the overall 
equilibrium outcomes. In Regions II and V, the market 
is mobile (𝛾 low), which implies that 𝑢∗ is low, but the 
buyers’ reservation price 𝑟 is even lower and as a result 
𝑟 < 𝑢∗ and thus 𝑢 = 𝑟. Therefore, in Regions II and V, 
again, the search cost has no effect on the outcomes. 
Note that the value of search cost 𝑐 does influence the 
boundaries of Regions II, III, V and VI: the higher the 
search cost, the larger the space where it is irrelevant. 
In Regions I and IV of Figure 3, the upper bound of the 
price range is determined by 𝑢∗, and thus the search 
cost 𝑐 influences the outcome. Specifically, in Region 
I, 𝛾 is low, thus 𝑢∗ is low and the reservation price 𝑟 is 
medium or high, which means the condition 𝑟 > 𝑢∗ 
can be easily satisfied; in Region IV, even though a 
high 𝛾 suggests a high 𝑢∗, 𝑟 is so high that 𝑟 > 𝑢∗ still 
holds. This means that when the the reservation price 
is sufficiently high and the market is not too immobile, 
the search cost of high-search-cost buyers limits the 
firms’ pricing strategies and the outcome. Specifically, 
a higher search cost leads to a higher price range and 
higher expected prices. 
6 Extension: Sequential Game 
In this section we extend the model to consider the case 
in which firms set advertising levels sequentially. It is 
often observed that industry leaders often announce 
their advertising plans and others tend to adjust theirs 
thereafter. 
Suppose Firm 1 (the leader) first commits to 
advertising intensity  𝛽1 ; then Firm 2 (the follower) 
observes 𝛽1  and sets intensity  𝛽2 . Both firms then 
choose prices simultaneously and buyers behave as 
described earlier. We solve this game to find the 
subgame perfect Nash equilibrium. Our purpose is to 
compare this equilibrium with the simultaneous game 
equilibrium. We focus on the market of relatively low 
mobility, where no advertising is never the best 
response of the follower and the equilibrium is not a 
kink point. 
We first show that the leader will choose to be the more 
advertised firm. Assume the best response of Firm 2 is 
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. We show previously 0 < 𝑏2′(𝛽1) < 1 if Firm 
2 is the less advertised firm and 𝑏2′(𝛽1) < 0 if Firm 2 
is the more advertised firm. So,  
𝜕𝜋1
𝜕𝑏2
< 0. Therefore, 
the equilibrium profit of Firm 1 never increases in the 
advertising level of the follower, so it is optimal for the 
leader to be the more advertised firm. 
Denote the equilibrium advertising levels in the 
sequential game by 𝛽1𝑠
∗  and 𝛽2𝑠
∗ , and those in the 
simultaneous game by 𝛽1𝑐
∗  and 𝛽2𝑐
∗ . The first-order 
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0. Firm 2 is the less advertised firm, so 0 < 𝑏2′(𝛽1) <
1 . Therefore 𝐴′(𝛽1𝑠
∗ ) < 𝐴′(𝛽1𝑐
∗ )  and 𝛽1𝑠
∗ < 𝛽1𝑐
∗ . By 
𝑏′2(𝛽1) > 0 , 𝛽2𝑠
∗ < 𝛽2𝑐
∗ . We have shown that each 
firm’s optimal profit decreases in the other firm’s 
advertising level, so both firms’ profits are higher in 
the sequential game than in the simultaneous game. We 
summarize this result in the following proposition. 
Proposition 6. The sequential game has a unique 
asymmetric pure strategy equilibrium where the 
leader has a higher advertising level than the 
follower. Both firms choose lower advertising 
levels and earn higher profits than in the 
simultaneous game. 
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The traffic flow is less skewed than that in the 
simultaneous game since  𝑏′2(𝛽1) ≤ 1 ; in this case, 
buyers benefit as well because market prices are now 
lower. 
Our result runs contrary to the standard Stackelberg 
production game. In the standard game, quantity is the 
decision variable and, in equilibrium, only the leader 
increases the production quantity and has a higher 
profit than that of the Cournot game while the follower 
is always worse off. The key insight that drives the 
difference is that in our model, the follower’s decision 
variable is a strategic complement to that of the leader; 
while in the production game, the follower’s decision 
variable is a strategic substitute. Therefore, in our 
setting the leader foresees that the follower will 
cooperate by cutting its own advertising if the leader 
limits its own spending to a lower level. Acting 
sequentially essentially provides a cooperating 
mechanism that enables the firms to collectively 
reduce advertising expenditures and increase profits. 
7 Concluding Remarks 
In this paper, we study how firms make optimal 
advertising and pricing decisions in face of 
competition. We find that even for symmetric e-tailers, 
it is optimal for them to choose differentiated 
strategies, along both the advertising and the pricing 
dimensions. 
Our results show that market mobility plays an 
important role in moderating firms’ decisions. When 
the market mobility is low, firms compete fiercely for 
consumers’ attention, and the firm with higher 
advertising intensity also charges a higher price and 
earns higher profits. When market mobility is high, 
however, firms adopt differentiated strategies: one 
firm advertises, while the other may choose not to 
advertise at all; furthermore, in such cases, no strategy 
is superior and either firm may make higher profits, 
depending on the parameters. Another interesting 
result is that the firms are most differentiated in their 
advertising levels when the market mobility is 
medium. In sum, the two strategies to attract 
customers—aggressive advertising or low prices—can 
be both effective when the market composition is 
balanced between shoppers and high-search-cost 
buyers, as long as the competing firms adopt 
differentiated strategies. When the market is 
dominated by one type of buyers, competition 
intensifies, in terms of either attention or price. 
We also compare the market outcome in our model 
with the case scenario in which firms do not have the 
option to advertise. As anticipated, the option to 
advertise leads to higher expected prices for any given 
market composition, and therefore consumer surplus is 
always reduced. It is interesting that the effects on 
firms are mixed: when market mobility is high, both 
e-tailers can make higher profits than without the 
option, even for the firm that advertises intensively; 
when market mobility is low, however, the option to 
advertise makes both e-tailers worse off. The 
advertisers gain from the option to advertise and gain 
most when the market mobility is low. 
This paper shows advertising costs have a different 
effect on prices and profits than previously shown in 
the literature. We find lower advertising costs do 
encourage firms to advertise more, but also lead to 
higher prices. The effect on profits has mixed results. 
When market mobility is relatively high, lower 
advertising costs lead to more skewed traffic, milder 
price competition, and higher profits. When market 
mobility level is low, the effect of lower advertising 
costs depends on the characteristics of the cost 
function. 
Another interesting result is the interaction between 
consumers’ search cost, willingness to pay, and the 
market composition. When consumers have low 
willingness to pay and/or the market is immobile, firms 
consider willingness to pay in their decisions and the 
search cost does not affect equilibrium outcome. When 
consumers have high willingness to pay and the market 
is mobile, search cost limits firms’ pricing power and 
consumers’ willingness to pay becomes irrelevant. 
In an extension to the model, we find that when firms 
can choose advertising levels sequentially, they choose 
lower advertising levels and lower prices and realize 
higher profits, as compared to the simultaneous game, 
because advertising levels of the two firms are strategic 
complements. 
In relation to the literature, our research shows that 
price dispersion can be a result of e-tailers’ 
differentiated strategies. Note that such price 
dispersion is sustained because advertising is available 
and the consumers are heterogeneous in search costs. 
Furthermore, we find that price dispersion is most 
conspicuous when market mobility is medium (see 
Figure 5a). This study also confirms that competition 
for consumers’ attention can be fierce, but shows that 
this is not always the case. When market mobility is 
low or medium, some e-tailers may not engage in 
competition for attention. 
This work has interesting managerial implications for 
e-tailers. For e-tailers seeking to outdo their 
competitors in terms of attracting consumers’ 
attention, it is important to take into consideration both 
the market segments and their competitors’ strategic 
responses. When buyers are heterogeneous in their 
search behavior, instead of head-to-head competition 
in advertising, e-tailers can choose to focus on different 
segments, by either pricing low or advertising 
intensively. This can relax price competition and lead 
to higher profits. With some knowledge of consumers’ 
search behavior, e-tailers that choose to advertise 




intensively and can afford to price higher—in effect, 
avoiding unnecessary price wars. E-tailers should also 
be fully aware of the market composition in order to 
make advertising and pricing decisions wisely. Lastly, 
if e-tailers could coordinate to set advertising levels 
sequentially, they would collectively benefit from 
lower advertising expenses and higher profits. 
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Proof of Lemma 1 
If 𝑆(𝑢𝑖) > 𝑐, the buyers that are quoted 𝑢𝑖  will definitely continue to search. Firm 𝑖 charging 𝑢𝑖  only makes sense 
when firm 𝑗 prices no lower than 𝑢𝑖 with positive possibility. Therefore 𝑢𝑗 ≥ 𝑢𝑖. 
Assume 𝑢𝑗 = 𝑢𝑖 and firm 𝑗 has a mass 𝑤 > 0 at 𝑢𝑗. The buyers that are quoted 𝑢𝑖 from firm 𝑖 only has 𝑤/2 probability 
buying from firm 𝑖. In comparison, the buyers that are quoted price 𝑢𝑖 − 𝜖, where 𝜖 is an arbitrarily small value, have 
𝑤 probability of buying from firm 𝑖. Price 𝑢𝑖 is strictly dominated by 𝑢𝑖 − 𝜖, which means 𝑢𝑖 cannot be charged with 
positive probability. The buyers that are quoted 𝑢𝑖 from firm 𝑗 will definitely continue to search and all will purchase 
from from 𝑖. Therefore, it’s unwise for firm 𝑗 to charge 𝑢𝑖, which contradicts with firm 𝑗 having a mass at 𝑢𝑖. If firm 𝑗 
doesn’t have a mass at 𝑢𝑗, the buyers that are quoted 𝑢𝑖 from firm 𝑖 will search and have probability 1 of buying from 
another firm. So, it is not optimal for firm 𝑖 to charge 𝑢𝑖 and 𝑢𝑖 can not be the upper bound. 
Assume 𝑢𝑗 > 𝑢𝑖. If 𝑆(𝑢𝑗) > 𝑐, the buyers that are quoted 𝑢𝑗 will definitely search again and will be certain to find a 
lower price from firm 𝑖 and never return to firm 𝑗. So, we must have 𝑆(𝑢𝑗) ≤ 𝑐. Then charging any price 𝑝𝑗 ∈ (𝑢𝑖 , 𝑢𝑗) 
is worse than charging price 𝑢𝑗 . It would be optimal for firm 𝑗 to charge prices in the interval (𝑢𝑖 , 𝑢𝑗) with zero 
probability. However, it also means that firm 𝑖 can charge a price higher than 𝑢𝑖 but smaller than 𝑢𝑗 without losing 
more sales than charging 𝑢𝑖, which contradicts with 𝑢𝑖 being the upper bound. 
In summary, we must have 𝑆(𝑢𝑖) ≤ 𝑐. 
Proof of Lemma 2 
Note that ∫ 𝐹𝑖
𝑧
𝑙𝑖
(𝑥)𝑑𝑥  increases in 𝑧 . Suppose 𝑆(𝑧) > 𝑐 . There must be a firm 𝑖  whose pricing strategy satisfies 
𝑓𝑖(𝑧)/(𝑓1(𝑧) + 𝑓2(𝑧)) > 𝑓𝑖(𝑢𝑖)/(𝑓1(𝑢𝑖) + 𝑓2(𝑢𝑖)). However, by reducing the density 𝑓𝑖(𝑧), so that 𝑓𝑖(𝑧)/(𝑓1(𝑧) +
𝑓2(𝑧)) = 𝑓𝑖(𝑢𝑖)/(𝑓1(𝑢𝑖) + 𝑓2(𝑢𝑖)), firm 𝑖  can always achieve 𝑆(𝑧) < 𝑐  and higher expected profit (because high-
search-cost buyers that are quoted 𝑧 will not search), which suggests original strategy is not optimal. Therefore, we 
must have 𝑆(𝑧) ≤ 𝑐. This means that for high-search-cost buyers, the expected benefit of additional searching is lower 
than the search cost, so they buy from the first e-tailer they visit. 
Proof of Lemma 3 
The proof is straightforward: for firm 𝑖, if 𝑙𝑖 < 𝑙𝑗, there must exist a price 𝑝, 𝑙𝑖 ≤ 𝑝 < 𝑙𝑗, charged with positive density. 
However, 𝑝 is strictly dominated by price 
𝑝+𝑙𝑗
2
 and therefore 𝑝 cannot be charged with positive density. Thus, we prove 
the lemma by contradiction. 
Proof of Lemma 4 
The proof of this lemma is similar to Narasimhan (1988) and Jing and Wen (2008). To limit the length of the paper, 
the proof is omitted. 
Proof of Lemma 6 
Assume 𝑢𝑖 > 𝑢𝑗 . On interval (𝑢𝑗, 𝑢𝑖), firm 𝑖’s expected payoff is 𝛱𝑖(𝑝) = 𝑝𝛼𝑖𝛾, which is an increasing function. 
Therefore, (𝑢𝑗, 𝑢𝑖) cannot be in support 𝑃𝑖 . Since 𝑢𝑖 is the upper bound, there must be a mass point at 𝑢𝑖. Also, we 
must have 𝑆(𝑢𝑖) = 𝑐, otherwise firm 𝑖 can slightly increase the upper bound, earning a higher payoff. 
Firm 𝑖 cannot have a mass at 𝑢𝑗. Assume firm 𝑖 has a mass 𝑤 at 𝑢𝑗, then firm 𝑗 can not have a mass at 𝑢𝑗 at the same 
time, since price 𝑢𝑗 − 𝜖 (𝜖 is an arbitrarily small positive number) yields a higher expected payoff than 𝑢𝑗 does. If firm 
𝑗 has no mass at 𝑢𝑗, firm 𝑖 can move the mass 𝑤 to 𝑢𝑖, earning a higher expected payoff, which violates the equilibrium 
condition. 
Assume 𝛼𝑖 ≥ 𝛼𝑗, then 𝐹𝑖(𝑝) ≤ 𝐹𝑗(𝑝). 𝑆(𝑢𝑗) ≤ ∫ 𝐹𝑗
𝑢𝑗
𝑙
(𝑥)𝑑𝑥 < 𝑆(𝑢𝑖) = 𝑐. Firm 𝑗 can earn a higher payoff by charging 
price 𝑢𝑗 + 𝜖, which violates the condition 𝑢𝑗 is the upper bound. 
Assume 𝛼𝑖 < 𝛼𝑗, then 𝐹𝑖(𝑝) > 𝐹𝑗(𝑝). If 𝑆(𝑢𝑗) < 𝑐, since (𝑢𝑗 , 𝑢𝑖) is not in 𝑃𝑖 , by charging any price 𝑝, 𝑢𝑗 < 𝑝 < 𝑢𝑖, 
firm 𝑗 can earn a higher payoff, which violates the equilibrium condition. Therefore, we must have 𝑆(𝑢𝑗) = 𝑐. So  
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By previous analysis, 𝑆(𝑢𝑖) = 𝑐, we have  
𝑐 = 𝑆(𝑢𝑖) = 𝑢𝑖 − 𝑢𝑗 + ∫ 𝐹𝑗
𝑢𝑗
𝑙










 By 𝜋𝑖 = 𝑙(1 − 𝛾 + 𝛼𝑖𝛾) = 𝑢𝑖𝛼𝑖𝛾, 𝑢𝑖 =
(1−𝛾+𝛼𝑖𝛾)𝑙
𝛼𝑖𝛾




















(𝑥 − 1)2 −
1−𝛼𝑗𝛾
(1−𝛼𝑗)𝛾
𝑥 + 1 > 0. 

















1. It is easy to verify that 𝛷 (
𝛼𝑗𝛾
1−𝛾+𝛼𝑗𝛾
)<0. Together with 𝛷(1) < 0,
(2𝛼𝑗−1)𝛾
1−𝛾
≥ 0, we conclude that 𝛷(𝑥) < 0 for 
𝛼𝑗𝛾
1−𝛾+𝛼𝑗𝛾
< 𝑥 < 1. However, it contradicts with previous result 𝛷(𝑥) > 0. 
In summary, assuming 𝑢𝑖 > 𝑢𝑗 only leads to contradictions. Since 𝑖 could be either firm, we must have 𝑢1 = 𝑢2. 
Proof of Proposition 1 
Based on Lemma 6, equation 4 and 5, we have the equilibrium prices as defined in the proposition. 
Proof of Corollary 4 
When 𝑟 ≤ 𝑢∗(0.5), the upper bound is restricted by 𝑟 for all possible 𝛼. So, 𝜋𝑗(𝛼) = 𝑟
𝛼𝛾(1−𝛼𝛾)
1−𝛾+𝛼𝛾
. It can be shown that 
𝜋𝑗(𝛼) is monotonously increasing in 𝛼 when 𝛾 ≤
3−√5
2






; monotonously decreasing 
in 𝛼 when 
2
3
≤ 𝛾 < 1. 
When 𝑟 ≥ 𝑢∗(1), the upper bound is not restricted by 𝑟 for all possible 𝛼. So, 𝜋𝑗(𝛼) = 𝑢
∗ 𝛼𝛾(1−𝛼𝛾)
1−𝛾+𝛼𝛾
. By numerical 
method, it can be shown that 𝜋𝑗(𝛼) is monotonously increasing in 𝛼 when 𝛾 ≤ 𝛾
∗ ≈ 0.53; unimodal in 𝛼 when 𝛾∗ <
𝛾 < 1. 
When 𝑢∗(0.5) < 𝑟 < 𝑢∗(1), by the monotonicity of 𝑢∗(𝛼, 𝛾) on 𝛼, there exists a unique ?̂? such that 𝑢∗(?̂? , 𝛾) = 𝑟. 




, according to previous discussion, no matter 𝑢(𝛼, 𝛾) = 𝑢∗(𝛼, 𝛾) or 𝑢(𝛼, 𝛾) = 𝑟, 𝜋𝑗(𝛼) is monotonously 




< 𝛾 ≤ 𝛾∗ , we have 𝑢(𝛼, 𝛾) = 𝑢∗(𝛼, 𝛾)  and 𝜋𝑗(𝛼)  increasing in 𝛼  when 𝛼 < ?̂? ; 𝑢(𝛼, 𝛾) = 𝑟  and 𝜋𝑗(𝛼) 
unimodal in 𝛼 when 𝛼 ≥ ?̂?. Connecting these two sections, we have 𝜋𝑗(𝛼) is unimodal in 𝛼 over 0.5 ≤ 𝛼 ≤ 1. 




 when 𝛼 < ?̂?; 𝜋𝑗(𝛼) = 𝑟
𝛼𝛾(1−𝛼𝛾)
1−𝛾+𝛼𝛾
 when 𝛼 ≥ ?̂?. In both cases, 𝜋𝑗(𝛼) is a 




 and on the upsloping part of function 𝑟
𝛼𝛾(1−𝛼𝛾)
1−𝛾+𝛼𝛾
. The reasoning is simple. If that is so, since 𝜋𝑗(?̂?) is 
on the downsloping part of function 𝑢∗(𝛼, 𝛾)
𝛼𝛾(1−𝛼𝛾)
1−𝛾+𝛼𝛾










|𝛼=?̂? < 0. 




That contradicts 𝜋𝑗(?̂?)  being on the upsloping part of function 𝑟
𝛼𝛾(1−𝛼𝛾)
1−𝛾+𝛼𝛾
. After ruling out this possibility, by 
combining these two sections, we have 𝜋𝑗 is unimodal in 𝛼 over 0.5 ≤ 𝛼 ≤ 1. 
Proof of Proposition 2 
Suppose there is an equilibrium 𝛽1
∗ = 𝛽2
∗ = 𝛽∗.  𝛽∗ can’t be zero since 𝐴′(0) = 0 implies each firm would deviate by 
increasing its advertising intensity. Equilibrium condition requires that no firm deviates by increasing or decreasing its 
advertising intensity. By equation 14, at 𝛽𝑖
∗ = 𝛽𝑗













𝑛 is not quasi-concave at 𝛽𝑖
∗ = 𝛽𝑗
∗ and there does not exist a symmetric pure strategy equilibrium. 
Proof of Lemma 7 
First, we restrict the strategy space to 𝛽𝑖 > 𝛽𝑗 . If 𝑢 = 𝑟, 𝜋𝑖
𝑛(𝛽𝑖) is clearly concave. If 𝑢 = 𝑢
∗, by 𝐴′(0) = 0, 𝐴′(1) is 
arbitrarily large, there must be a local maximizer for 𝜋𝑖
𝑛; 𝜋𝑖
𝑛(𝛽𝑖) is also concave at the maximizer. If, for certain 𝛽𝑗, 
there is a value 𝛽𝑖
†
 that satisfies 𝑟 = 𝑢∗, 𝜋𝑖
𝑛(𝛽𝑖) will not be differentiable at 𝛽𝑖
†








† ; therefore 
𝜋𝑖
𝑛(𝛽𝑖) is also concave at 𝛽𝑖
†
. The best response 𝑏𝑖(𝛽𝑗) could be either an interior solution or a corner solution (kink 
point) that satisfies 𝑟 = 𝑢∗. If 𝑏𝑖(𝛽𝑗) is an interior maximizer to the profit function with 𝑢 = 𝑟, the first-order condition 
will show that 𝑏𝑖 is independent of (𝛽𝑗); in other words, 𝑏′𝑖(𝛽𝑗) = 0 and its graph is horizontal. If 𝑏𝑖(𝛽𝑗) is an interior 
maximizer to the profit function with 𝑢 = 𝑢∗, by the first-order condition and the implicit function theorem, 𝑏′𝑖(𝛽𝑗) <
0 and its graph is downward-sloping. If 𝑏𝑖(𝛽𝑗) is the kink-point, 𝑏𝑖(𝛽𝑗) = 2𝑢
∗−1(𝑟) + 𝛽𝑗 − 1, therefore 𝑏′𝑖(𝛽𝑗) = 1. 




= −𝐴′(𝑏𝑖(𝛽𝑗)) < 0. We represent the best response function 
derived under condition 𝛽𝑖 > 𝛽𝑗 by 𝑏𝑖
(1)
(𝛽𝑗). 
Now consider the strategy space 𝛽𝑖 < 𝛽𝑗. For either 𝑢 = 𝑟 or 𝑢 = 𝑢
∗, 𝜋𝑖
𝑛(𝛽𝑖) is a unimodal function of 𝛽𝑖. At the kink 
point 𝛽𝑖
†












† . So 𝜋𝑖
𝑛 must be a unimodal function of 𝛽𝑖 in general. If the best 
response 𝑏𝑖(𝛽𝑗) is an interior maximizer to the profit function with either 𝑢 = 𝑟 or 𝑢 = 𝑢
∗, by the first-order condition 
and the implicit function theorem, 0 < 𝑏′𝑖(𝛽𝑗) < 1 , so its graph is upward-sloping. If 𝑏𝑖(𝛽𝑗)  is the kink-point, 
𝑏𝑖(𝛽𝑗) = 1 + 𝛽𝑗 − 2𝑢




= −𝐴′(𝑏𝑖(𝛽𝑗)) < 0 by the envelope theorem. 








> 0. We represent the best response function 
derived under condition 𝛽𝑖 < 𝛽𝑗 by 𝑏𝑖
(2)
(𝛽𝑗). 
According to above results, 𝑏𝑖
(1)
(𝛽𝑗) is always nonincreasing except for an possible interval, so it must intersect the 
diagonal 𝛽𝑖 = 𝛽𝑗  at certain value 𝛽 , which implies 𝑏𝑖
(1)
(𝛽) = 𝛽 . 𝑏𝑖
(2)
(𝛽𝑗) never intersects 𝛽𝑖 = 𝛽𝑗  for 𝛽𝑗 > 0 since 
𝑏𝑖
(2)′
(𝛽𝑗) < 1  in general and 𝑏𝑖
(2)′
(𝛽𝑗) = 1  just for an possible interval. Therefore 𝜋𝑖
𝑛(𝑏𝑖
(2)





(𝛽); 𝛽). It is easy to see that 𝜋𝑖
𝑛(𝑏𝑖
(1)
(0); 0) > 𝜋𝑖
𝑛(0; 0) = 𝜋𝑖
𝑛(𝑏𝑖
(2)







(𝛽)) must cross at a point ?̂?, such that 𝜋𝑖
𝑛(𝑏𝑖
(1)
(?̂?); ?̂?) = 𝜋𝑖
𝑛(𝑏𝑖
(2)







(𝛽𝑗))/𝜕𝛽𝑗. So ?̂? must be unique. Therefore, the general best response function is 𝑏𝑖 =
𝑏𝑖
(1)
 when 𝛽𝑗 < ?̂? and 𝑏𝑖 = 𝑏𝑖
(2)
 when 𝛽𝑗 > ?̂?. 
Proof of Proposition 3 
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∗), (?̂? , 0), (𝛽𝑗
∗, 0) if 𝑏𝑖
(2)
(𝛽𝑗







∗) since 0 ≤ 𝑏𝑖
(2)′
(𝛽𝑗) ≤ 1 by the proof of Lemma 7. 








≤ 0, we have 
 𝜋𝑖
𝑛′(𝛽𝑗
∗ + 𝑥; 𝛽𝑗
∗) ≥ 𝜋𝑖+
𝑛′(𝛽𝑗
∗ + 𝑥; 𝛽𝑗
∗ + 𝑥). (15) 
Because 𝜋𝑖+′(𝛽𝑗
∗ + 𝑥; 𝛽𝑗
∗ + 𝑥) + 𝜋𝑖−′(𝛽𝑗
∗ + 𝑥; 𝛽𝑗






∗ + 𝑥; 𝛽𝑗
∗ + 𝑥) > −𝜋𝑖−
𝑛′(𝛽𝑗
∗ + 𝑥; 𝛽𝑗
∗ + 𝑥). (16) 
𝜋𝑖
𝑛(𝛽𝑖; 𝛽𝑗) is concave for 𝛽𝑖 < 𝛽𝑗. So  
 𝜋𝑖−
𝑛′(𝛽𝑗
∗ + 𝑥; 𝛽𝑗
∗ + 𝑥) < 𝜋𝑖
𝑛′(𝛽𝑗
∗; 𝛽𝑗
∗ + 𝑥). (17) 
Since 𝛽𝑗
∗ − (𝛽𝑗
∗ − 𝑥) = (𝛽𝑗
∗ + 𝑥) − 𝛽𝑗
∗ and 𝐴′(𝛽𝑗
∗ − 𝑥) < 𝐴′(𝛽𝑗
∗), we have  
 𝜋𝑖
𝑛′(𝛽𝑗




∗ + 𝑥). (18) 
By inequations 15, 16, 17 and 18, 𝜋𝑖
𝑛′(𝛽𝑗
∗ + 𝑥; 𝛽𝑗
∗) > −𝜋𝑖
𝑛′(𝛽𝑗





























































Proof of Corollary 5 
In this proof we characterize the equilibrium and the partition of the parameter space. 
Define 𝛽1(𝛽2) = argmax𝛽1,𝛽1∈[0,1]{𝑟𝛼𝛾 − 𝐴(𝛽1)} , 𝛽1(𝛽2) = argmax𝛽1,𝛽1∈[0,1]{𝑢
∗𝛼𝛾 − 𝐴(𝛽1)} ,  𝛽2(𝛽1) =
argmax𝛽2,𝛽2∈[0,1]{𝑟𝜙(𝛼) − 𝐴(𝛽2)}, and  𝛽2(𝛽1) = argmax𝛽2,𝛽2∈[0,1]{𝑢






















, the left derivative of each firm’s profit with regard to its advertising level should be no 
less than zero, and the right should be no higher. Define the minimal 𝑟 that induces such an equilibrium by 𝑟
̲
. The 








† = 0, 𝛽2


















† = 0, 𝛽2
† > 0 or 𝛽2









The equilibrium advertising strategy (𝛽1
∗, 𝛽2









































∗)),   𝑟 < 𝑟
(𝛽1
†, 𝛽2
†), 𝑟 ≤ 𝑟 ≤ 𝑟
(𝛽1(𝛽2
∗), 𝛽2(𝛽1
∗)), 𝑟 > 𝑟
. (20) 











) is an indeterminate equation; so there exist a 
continuum of equilibria, among which the one of the smallest advertising  levels are preferred by both firms for it 
yields the highest profits for both firms. 
We now characterize the parameter partition for each type of equilibrium. The curves 𝑟 and 𝑟
̲
 in Figure 3 are defined 











= 0. Note here 𝑢 = 𝑢∗, so line ○2  is a straight line. Line ○3 , which separates Region V and VI, is 




∗ |𝛽2∗=0,𝑟=𝑢∗ = 0. 
Proof of Proposition 4 




 in each region of the parameter space. 
When 𝛾 is small (Region I, II, V in Figure 3), 𝛽2
∗ = 0, 𝛽1




. By the first-order 







































∗ < 0. 
When 𝛾 is sufficiently large (Region III, IV, VI in Figure 3), 𝛽𝑖
∗ > 0, 𝑖 = 1,2. In Region III or IV, by the system of first-















































∗2 < 0, |𝐻| > 0. 











































































) /|𝐻| > 0.
. (22) 
Therefore, the advertising levels of both firms increase with 𝛾. On a side note, the limiting values are: lim𝛾→1𝛽1
∗ =
lim𝛾→1𝛽2








 cannot be resolved with general cost functions. It is numerically verified that, 




> 0, 𝑖 = 1,2. 
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> 0 whenever 𝛽2
∗ > 0. 
Second, we analyze the sign of 
𝜕𝛼∗
𝜕𝛾





∗ = 0; so 
𝜕𝛼∗
𝜕𝛾
> 0. In Region V or VI, 
𝜕𝛼∗
𝜕𝛾































  is greater than 
𝑟
2
















This result suggests that the advertising intensity of Firm 2 will grow faster than that of Firm 1, and the skewness of 










> 0 when 𝛾  is small and 
𝜕𝛼∗
𝜕𝛾
< 0  when 𝛾  is large, and the maximum of 𝛼∗  must be reached at an 
intermediate 𝛾. Thus, the buyer traffic flow is most skewed at an intermediate proportion of high-search- cost buyers. 
Proof of Corollary 7 
If 𝑏𝑖  is an interior solution to the profit maximization problem, by the envelope theorem, we have  𝜕𝜋𝑖
𝑛/𝜕𝛽𝑗 =
−𝐴′(𝑏𝑖(𝛽𝑗)). If 𝑏𝑖 is a kink point, we still have 𝜕𝜋𝑖
𝑛/𝜕𝛽𝑗 = −𝐴′(𝑏𝑖(𝛽𝑗)). Therefore, given 𝛽𝑖 is the best response to 𝛽𝑗, 
𝜋𝑖














Proof of Proposition 5 
When 𝛾 is small (Region I, II, V in Figure 3), 𝛽2
∗ = 0, 𝛽1




. By the first-order 





























When 𝛾 is sufficiently large (Region III, IV, VI in Figure 3), 𝛽𝑖
∗ > 0, 𝑖 = 1,2. In Region III or VI, by the system of first-
















































∗2 < 0, |𝐻| > 0. 





= − ?̃? ′(𝛽𝑖
∗) < 0, so  























































 cannot be resolved with general cost functions. It is numerically verified that, 




< 0, 𝑖 = 1,2. 









= − ?̃? ′(𝛽2
†) < 0. By 𝑟 = 𝑢∗(𝛼∗), 
𝜕𝛼∗
𝜕𝜃









Summarizing above results, decreases in advertising costs always induce firms to increase advertising levels except in 





By above results, in Region I  or  II , 
𝜕𝛼∗
𝜕𝜃
< 0 ; in Region V  or VI , 
𝜕𝛼∗
𝜕𝜃


















. Therefore the sign of 
𝜕𝛼∗
𝜕𝜃
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